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The Logic of Measure in Hegel’s Science of Logic 
Stephen Houlgate 
 
Abstract 
 
In his account of measure in the Logic Hegel discusses various natural phenomena, such as 
specific heat and specific gravity, and associates each one with a particular form of measure. 
Yet Hegel’s conception of measure is not guided by his understanding of nature or by modern 
science. His derivation of the forms of measure proceeds immanently by rendering explicit 
what is implicit in the concept of measure itself. Natural phenomena are then adduced as 
examples of the measures that have been derived logically. My aim in this essay is to explain 
how the distinctive logic of measure proceeds in its early stages.   
 
In seiner Behandlung des Masses in der Logik erörtert Hegel verschiedene natürliche 
Phänomene, wie spezifische Wärme und spezifisches Gewicht, und er verbindet jedes mit 
einer besonderen Form des Masses. Hegels Auffassung des Masses wird jedoch weder durch 
sein Verständnis der Natur, noch durch die moderne Naturwissenschaft bestimmt. Seine 
Ableitung der Formen des Masses verläuft auf immanente Weise durch das Explizitmachen 
dessen, was im Begriff des Masses selbst implizit ist. Natürliche Phänomene werden dann als 
Beispiele der Masse, die logisch abgeleitet worden sind, angeführt. Mein Ziel in diesem 
Aufsatz besteht darin, zu erläutern, wie sich die eigentümliche Logik des Masses in ihren 
ersten Phasen entfaltet. 
______________________________________________________ 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In the first Critique Kant counts among the conditions of the objects of experience the 
categories of “quantity” and of “quality”, but he does not derive one set of categories from 
the other logically.1 In the Science of Logic, by contrast, Hegel argues that quantity is made 
necessary logically by quality, specifically by the qualitative category of the “one” (Eins) and 
the connected categories of “repulsion” and “attraction” (which, in quantity, become 
                                                          
1 CPR B 106, 202-218. S. Houlgate 2014, p. 16-17. Note that, for Kant (in contrast to Hegel), “quantity” and 
“quality” are not themselves categories, but are rather the names of two sets or “classes” (Klassen) of categories 
(CPR B 110). 
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“discreteness” and “continuity”).2 Hegel goes on to argue that quantity in turn makes quality 
necessary and thereby gives rise to the explicit unity of the two in the form of measure 
(Maß). Measure, he notes, was a central concept for the Greeks, who, indeed, maintained that 
“everything has a measure” (SL 329 / LS 367).3 It is, however, a concept that is lost on Kant, 
as it is lost on Spinoza.4 Hegel’s speculative logic thus restores the concept of measure, 
neglected by the moderns, to its rightful place in our understanding; and it does so by 
demonstrating that measure is made necessary logically by the very quantity and quality that 
for Kant — albeit in the guise of two “classes” of categories5 — are the indispensable 
conditions of objective cognition. 
Now in his account of measure in the Logic Hegel discusses numerous natural 
phenomena and laws, many of which were unknown to the Greeks, and he associates each 
one with a particular form of measure. These phenomena and laws include specific heat, 
specific gravity and Kepler’s third law of planetary motion.6 Hegel’s interest in these aspects 
of nature is not accidental, but follows from the fact that “the different forms in which 
measure is realized belong also to different spheres of natural reality” (SL 331 / LS 369). It is 
important to emphasise, however, that Hegel’s conception of measure is not itself guided by 
his understanding of nature or by the findings of modern science. His derivation of the 
various forms of measure proceeds immanently by rendering explicit what is implicit in the 
concept of measure itself. (“The whole course of philosophising”, Hegel states in the 
Encyclopaedia, is, indeed, “nothing else but the mere positing [Setzen] of what is already 
contained in a concept” [EL § 88 R].) Natural phenomena and laws are then adduced as 
examples of the measures that have been derived logically. Speculative logic is understood by 
Hegel to be both a logic and an ontology or metaphysics: an account of the necessary 
categories of thought and of the fundamental ways of being.7 The examples from nature thus 
serve to confirm that the measures made necessary by logic belong just as much to the world. 
                                                          
2 S. SL 163-178 / LS 166-184, and Houlgate 2014, p. 17-19.   
3 S. also EL § 107 A, and Harris 1983, p. 146. 
4 S. SL 327-328 / LS 364-365. 
5 S. note 1 above. 
6 S. SL 338-339, 341-343, 349-351 / LS 377-378, 381-383, 390-392, and Rinaldi 1992, p. 173. 
7 S. SL 27 / LS 6, and Houlgate 2006, p. 115-143. 
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 Logic, then, does not follow nature or natural science, but nature exemplifies the 
structures derived a priori by logic.8 If we are to understand why there are measures in the 
world, therefore, it is crucial that we understand the distinctive logic of measure that makes 
its various forms necessary. My aim in this essay is to further such understanding by 
explaining, as clearly as I can, how that logic proceeds in its early stages.   
 
II. The Specific Quantum 
 
In the Logic a measure is initially some determinate amount, or “specific quantum”, that 
confers a determinate quality on a thing and without which the thing would lose that quality 
and cease to be what it is (SL 333 / LS 371). A mere quantum can be changed without 
destroying the thing concerned: the latter can become bigger or smaller and remain what it 
is.9 The quantum (or range of quanta) that constitutes a thing’s measure, however, cannot be 
changed without destroying the thing, because it is precisely what gives the thing, or enables 
it to have, its particular quality: it “belongs”, and is specific, to that quality.10 Water, for 
example, must be kept below 100o C or it turns into steam, and “a republican constitution like 
that of Athens, or an aristocratic constitution tempered by democracy, is suitable only for 
states of a certain size” (SL 332 / LS 370).11  
 Speculative logic proves that being cannot just be indeterminate but must take the 
form of determinate, finite things. Such things must also have a certain quantity or 
“magnitude”, and they must have a certain measure: a specific quantum, thanks to which they 
are what they are.12 Hegel points out, however, that measure is in fact an ambiguous 
determination.  
                                                          
8 On the relation between Hegel’s philosophy (including his philosophy of nature) and natural science, s. 
Houlgate 2005, p. 110-121. By contrast, Ruschig contends that, in the chapter on real measure at least, the 
logical transitions are actually determined by the scientific models that Hegel cites as mere ‘examples’; s. 
Ruschig 1997, p. 16, 28, 46, 233. Kruck argues, as I do in this essay, that Hegel’s account of measure proceeds 
logically and is intelligible “without the integrated, concrete material of intuition” supplied by science; s. Kruck 
2014, p. 123-124. 
9 S. SL 186 / LS 193, and Houlgate 2014, p. 17. 
10 SL 336 / LS 374. Miller translates “ihr zugehörigen” as “attaching to it”. S. also Moretto 2002, p. 76. 
11 S. also EL § 108 A, and Stace 1955, p. 169-170. Ruschig points out that water starts to evaporate below 100o 
C, but that at boiling point not only does the surface evaporate, but all the water turns to steam; s. Ruschig 1997, 
p. 287.  
12 On Hegel’s logic of quality, s. Houlgate 2006, p. 263-435. 
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Note that a measure is not an ideal standard that a thing has to meet in order to be 
itself; it is the magnitude a thing actually has and to which it owes its distinctive quality. This 
magnitude must be (or fall within the range of) the thing’s measure, for if the thing has it, it 
obviously permits the thing to be what it is. The ambiguity of such a magnitude is this. As a 
simple quantum, it can change like any other: it is “an indifferent magnitude” that is “capable 
of increase and decrease” (SL 334 / LS 372). As a measure, however, it grounds, or makes 
possible, the quality of the thing. This in turn sets a limit to the extent to which it can change: 
for if it is to preserve the quality concerned, it can change only within a certain range. The 
measure is thus a thing’s magnitude or quantum that is “distinguished [verschieden] from 
itself as a quantum” and limits the latter (SL 334 / LS 372). The actual temperature of the 
water before us is a quantum that can vary from 1o to 99o C. This temperature range enables 
the water to remain a liquid and so constitutes its measure. Yet that range is also just a range 
of quanta, and as such can be increased or decreased beyond the limits of the measure that it 
is. If this happens, however, water will change its quality and become ice or steam. The 
quantum (or range of quanta) that something actually has thus constitutes both the bare, 
changeable quantum of the thing and the measure that sets a limit to the changes that 
quantum can undergo.13  
Note, though, that that measure cannot itself prevent the thing’s quantum from 
exceeding its limit: for that quantum as such is irreducibly changeable, and the measure 
cannot take this feature away from it. The measure does not, therefore, make it impossible for 
the quantum to go beyond the limit set for it, but simply determines that, if it does so, the 
quality disappears. In this sense, a thing’s magnitude, which allows the thing to be what it is 
and so is or belongs to its measure, is actually impotent as a measure in the face of its own 
quantitative nature.  
It follows from the nature of measure, therefore, that a thing can change its quantity 
without altering its quality, but that it will (or may) reach a point at which that quality, and 
therewith the thing, ceases to be. This change in quality and demise of the thing, Hegel 
writes, will appear “unexpected”, if one is unaware of the thing’s measure, because it will 
seem that only a change in quantity is occurring. One can then be tempted to try to make such 
change in quality intelligible with the help of the idea of “gradualness” (Allmählichkeit): if 
one focuses one’s attention on the changes in quantity, one will be able to see — or so one 
might think — the qualitative change come about ‘gradually’ before one’s eyes. Yet Hegel 
                                                          
13 S. Ferrini 1988, p. 34, Hartmann 1999, p. 151, Carlson 2007, p. 206, and Winfield 2012, p. 145.  
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insists that thinking of qualitative change as merely ‘gradual’ actually reduces it to something 
purely quantitative and so makes it impossible to see any qualitative change, or to explain 
how the latter could occur (SL 335 / LS 373). The only thing that can explain how a change 
in quantity brings about a change of quality is the measure of a thing; and understanding the 
latter requires us to give up the desire to explain everything in quantitative terms.  
 In this context Hegel briefly discusses the ancient Greek “sorites” paradoxes (from the 
Greek for heap, soros), attributed to Eubulides of Miletus.14 “The question was asked”, Hegel 
writes, “does the pulling out of a single hair from the head or from a horse’s tail produce 
baldness, or does a heap cease to be a heap if a grain is removed?” (SL 335 / LS 373). The 
answer, surely, is no, and it continues to be no when one pulls out a second and then a third 
hair, or removes a second and then a third grain. Indeed, formal logic tells us that the answer 
should remain no, as long as one continues to remove just one item at a time. Yet, of course, 
we eventually reach a point at which we say that the head is bald or there is no more heap; so 
pulling out a single hair would appear to make us bald after all, leaving us with a paradox. 
 Hegel insists that such paradoxes are neither “an empty or pedantic joke”, nor merely 
sophistical as if the contradiction they contain were a “sham”, but that they are “in 
themselves correct” (SL 336 / LS 374, translation altered). They are, in other words, not just 
puzzles to be solved or dissolved with the resources of formal logic, but paradoxes that 
disclose a fundamental truth. This truth is the truth of measure, namely, that quantitative 
differences are not merely quantitative, but at some point — or within a certain range of 
points — make a qualitative difference. The value of the paradoxes, therefore, is that they 
expose the “mistake” of “assuming a quantity to be only an indifferent limit”. As Hegel 
notes, those who think that repeatedly removing just one grain should not eliminate the heap 
forget that “the individually insignificant quantities [ … ] add up” and that the sum 
constitutes a “qualitative whole” (SL 335 / LS 374). Similarly, those to whom the steady 
increase in their wealth “appears at first to be their good fortune” overlook the fact that such 
an increase may well at some point lead to their misfortune (SL 336 / LS 374).15  
 
                                                          
14 On the early history of these paradoxes, s. Moline 1969. 
15 From the Hegelian point of view, the phenomenon exposed by sorites paradoxes is thus not principally the 
‘vagueness’ of concepts such as ‘heap’, but (in Harris’s words) “the interdependence of the moments of 
measure” (Harris 1983, p. 147). For an account of the relation between the paradoxes and the topic of 
vagueness, s. Hyde 2011. On Hegel’s discussion of the paradoxes, s. also Johnson 1988, p. 70, and Winfield 
2012, p. 145. 
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III. The Specifying Measure 
 
A measure is a quantum that constitutes (or enables there to be) a certain quality. We know 
from the first section of the doctrine of being, however, that quality does not stand alone, but 
is the quality of something (Etwas).16 A measure is thus not just an abstraction, but a quantum 
constitutive of a thing with a certain quality, and it is as such that it differs from a “mere” 
quantum in the way we have seen.17 Following the logic of “something”, however, that mere 
quantum should itself be something other than the measure. The measure is immediately itself 
and must, therefore, be immediately different from a quantum that is in turn immediately 
itself. When this thought is rendered explicit, a new form of measure emerges. This new 
measure does not simply differ from the mere quantum that it is, but both sides now have “a 
distinct existence” (eine verschiedene Existenz) (SL 336 / LS 375).  
Yet, as we know, a measure is not indifferent to the mere quantum, but sets a limit to 
it and in that sense ‘negates’ it. This continues to be true of the new measure: it, too, limits 
the mere quantum that lies outside it. It does so on the basis of its own specific determinacy 
and so proves to be the activity of specifying that external quantum. Measure has thus now to 
be understood, not just by itself, but in relation to an “alterable, external” quantum, which it 
specifies (SL 336 / LS 375).18  
 It should be stressed that what drives the logic of measure forward here is the double 
character of the measure itself. On the one hand, a measure is the unity of quantity and 
quality: it is a quantum that constitutes and sustains a quality. On the other hand, quantity and 
quality remain different in the measure, since the latter contains quantity in two forms: once 
as constituting quality and thus as the measure, and once as a mere quantum. Moreover, the 
quantum as qualitative — as the measure — ‘negates’ the mere quantum that the measure 
also is by setting a limit to it: this limit is one that that quantum cannot exceed without 
undermining the quality attached to the measure. This difference between the quantum as 
measure and as mere quantum initially falls within the measure itself: the measure sets a limit 
to the changes that it, as mere quantum, can undergo. As a self-relating something, however, 
                                                          
16 S. SL 115 / LS 109-110, and Houlgate 2006, p. 312-330. 
17 Hegel employs the phrase “[the] mere quantum” (das bloße Quantum) on SL 336 / LS 375. 
18 Kruck appears to get confused here. He correctly states that a difference emerges between a “specifying” 
quantum and a quantum being specified, but he describes the latter as a “specific quantum” and an “intrinsic 
determinateness” (ansichseiende Bestimmtheit) when these terms actually characterise the specifying quantum. 
S. Kruck 2014, p. 125, and SL 329, 333-334 / LS 367, 371-372. 
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the measure now sets itself in relation to a quantum that is (or belongs to) something of its 
own and so falls outside the measure itself. In this way, the difference internal to the measure 
mutates logically into a relation between the measure and another quantum. Such a relation is 
thus not just an accidental feature of measure, but renders explicit the difference that is at the 
heart of the measure from the start.19 
 A measure ‘in relation’ first specifies the quantum that it confronts by providing an 
external measure for it: one that Hegel calls a “rule” (Regel) or “standard” (Maßstab) (SL 337 
/ LS 375).20 Since this rule and the external quantum are initially just immediately other than 
one another, the former does not actively negate and change the latter (as the third form of 
measure will do) but simply stands next to it. Yet, as a measure, the rule must specify and 
limit the quantum in some way. So how does it do so? We learn in the account of quantity 
that a quantum as such — or, more precisely, a quantum as a number — is a determinate 
“amount” of featureless “units” (SL 202-203 / LS 213-14).21 The rule, therefore, must specify 
either the amount of the external quantum, or the units it comprises, or both. The amount, 
however, belongs to the quantum, since it makes the latter the quantum or number that it is, 
and so it falls outside the rule. Accordingly, the rule — unlike the first form of measure — 
does not determine how big something may be or what degree it may reach. It must, 
therefore, specify the quantum by providing the unit (Einheit) in terms of which the latter is 
to be measured. Now the rule, as a measure, is something specific and determinate, so the 
unit it provides for the quantum must also be determinate.22 This unit is thus not just a bare 
unit as such, but a determinate one, such as a foot or a metre, and the quantum, which stands 
                                                          
19 S. SL 330 / LS 368: “The development of measure contains the differentiation of these moments [ ... ]”; s. 
also Hartmann 1999, p. 151, and Kruck 2014, p. 129. Burbidge maintains that we move to a new measure in 
order to “improve the rigour of our measuring”, rather than by rendering explicit the difference that is implicit in 
the specific quantum (Burbidge 2006, p. 54). In my view, however, Hegel’s logic of measure is not (or not 
principally) about the ways in which we measure things, but it sets out the measures inherent in being itself.  
20 The thought of a rule or standard is introduced by Hegel in the first sub-division of the first chapter on 
measure (1.A) — in which he examines the initial immediate measure, or “specific quantum” — but, strictly 
speaking, that thought does not belong there. A rule or standard is a measure that, unlike the “specific quantum”, 
is explicitly distinct from the quantum to which it relates, and so it belongs in the second sub-division of that 
chapter (1.B.a) (s. SL 333 / LS 371). Kruck appears to conflate the initial measure with the rule or standard in 
his discussion of 1.A — though he goes on to point out that the rule must also be conceived as “something for 
itself” that is distinct from the quantum for which it provides the rule; s. Kruck 2014, p. 126-127, 129. 
21 S. Houlgate 2014, p. 20-22. 
22 Measure is, at the start of its logical development, “its own determinateness [Bestimmtheit] within itself” (SL 
333 / LS 371), and such determinateness remains a feature of measure throughout that development (until we 
reach the thought of “indifference”).  
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in relation to the rule, must in turn be a certain amount of such units. The rule specifies the 
quantum, therefore, by determining the latter to be an amount, not just of bare units, but of 
units of a specific character.23  
 Note that, pace John Burbidge, Hegel is here not just describing a process of 
measuring in which we engage.24 He is arguing that being itself must produce measures and 
that these measures themselves serve to specify the magnitudes of other things. Yet insofar as 
they are no more than a rule or standard of measurement, such measures remain external to 
the quanta they specify. They can thus be replaced by other measures and so are “arbitrary” 
magnitudes (SL 334 / LS 372). Furthermore, due to their externality these measures are 
themselves quanta that contain their own amounts. They can thus be specified in turn in 
terms of other units, just as a foot can be determined as an amount of inches.25  
 Hegel now points out, however, that measure must take a further, third form. This 
emerges as we continue to render explicit what is implicit in being a measure. As we have 
seen, the measure is not only the immediate unity of quantity and quality but a something 
(Etwas) in its own right. As such, it must be accompanied by, and directly related to, another 
something, and so, as Hegel puts it, it must have “in it this side of being-for-other” (SL 337 / 
LS 376). In accordance with the logic of “something”, however, the first something must also 
be open to being changed by the other to which it relates and so have what Hegel earlier, in 
the account of quality, called a “constitution” (Beschaffenheit).26 Since the other is here 
principally another quantum, the something must be open in particular to having its quantum 
changed by that other.  
Yet the first something is not merely a something, but also a measure. As such, it 
must limit and specify the quantitative change that the other brings about in it. In his account 
of quality Hegel argued that something is not completely at the mercy of other things, but has 
an intrinsic being or “determination” (Bestimmung) of its own that affects how other things 
affect and change it: “the determining from outside is at the same time determined by the 
                                                          
23 There appears to be some confusion in Kruck’s account of the rule in 1.B.a, when he describes the rule as 
providing, for the quantum to which it relates, “the measure for determining the latter’s measure” (das Maß der 
Bestimmung von dessen Maß) (Kruck 2014, p. 130, my emphasis). On my view, the rule relates to a “mere 
quantum” (SL 336 / LS 375), not to a quantum that is also a measure, and it simply provides the unit of which 
that quantum is a certain amount.   
24 S. Burbidge 1996, p. 27-28, 30, and Burbidge 2006, p. 53-54. 
25 S. SL 337 / LS 375. For the “externality” of quantity, s., for example, SL 185, 239, 314 / LS 192, 258, 350.  
26 S. SL 123-125 / LS 119-121, and Houlgate 2006, p. 348-356. 
9 
 
something’s own, immanent determination” (SL 125 / LS 121). We now see more clearly one 
of the things that this means: through the measure that it contains, something limits in a 
specific way — and so specifies — the changes in quantity to which it is subjected by 
another. 
The measure has thus mutated, logically, from an external standard or rule into an 
explicitly “specifying measure” (SL 337 / LS 376).27 Accordingly, it now no longer relates 
only to a quantum that is outside and other than it, but in relating to another quantum it also 
relates to itself, to the quantum that it is: for it specifies the quantum within itself that comes 
from the other. In this respect the measure blends together the relation to another quantum 
that characterizes the second form of measure with the specifying of its own quantum that 
characterizes the first form. This third form of measure thus embodies more explicitly than 
either of its predecessors what it is to be a measure.  
Note, too, that its relation to the “mere” quantum is more active and negative than in 
the case of the rule. The rule simply limits such a quantum to being an amount of these units, 
rather than those; it thereby remains external to that quantum and leaves the latter itself 
unaltered. By contrast, the new specifying measure limits the change that is imposed on it by 
the other quantum, and thereby negates and changes that change: it alters the quantum that it 
is given by the other. In this way, the something negates the mere quantum in two senses: it 
negates its own quantum insofar as the latter is determined by the other quantum, and so it 
negates that other quantum as well. It does so in a specific way that is governed by its own 
measure. In specifying the effect that another quantum has on it, therefore, something shows 
itself to be something of its own, something for itself. Hegel pulls these thoughts together in 
the following lines: 
 
Something, in so far as it is a measure within itself, has the magnitude of its 
quality altered from outside itself; it does not accept this externally imposed 
alteration as an arithmetical amount: its measure reacts against it, relates itself as 
something intensive [ein Intensives] to the amount and assimilates it in a 
distinctive way [auf eine eigentümliche Weise]; it alters the externally imposed 
alteration, makes this quantum into a different one and through this specifying 
                                                          
27 Note that in the 1st edition of the Logic’s ‘doctrine of being’, Hegel continues to call this measure a “rule”; s. 
LS 1812 230: “In the rule, on the contrary [ ... ]” (In der Regel hingegen [ ... ]). In the 2nd edition this is changed 
to: “In the specifying measure, on the contrary [ ... ]” (In dem spezifizierenden Maße hingegen [ ... ]) (SL 338 / 
LS 376). 
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shows itself to be being-for-self [Fürsichsein] in this externality (SL 337 / LS 
376, translation altered).  
 
It is crucial to recognise the complexity of the logical structure that Hegel is setting 
out here. There is one something in relation to another, the first of which is a measure, 
whereas the second is merely a quantum. The one that is a measure, however, is thereby itself 
a quantum. As a measure, therefore, it stands in a negative relation to both its own quantum 
and that of the other: it negates its own quantum, insofar as the latter is in turn determined by 
the other. More precisely, it negates the amount that is added to its own quantum by the other. 
Here we see the clear difference between a merely quantitative relation between quanta and 
the more nuanced relation between a quantum and a measure. If one bare quantum is added to 
another bare quantum, the latter increases by precisely what is added to it: add 2 to 3, and 3 
becomes 5. Something with a measure, however, does not directly take on what is added to it: 
as Hegel puts it, it does not accept the “arithmetical amount” that is given to it. Rather, it 
accepts, and so increases by, an amount that has been specified by its measure. This 
additional amount remains a quantum, and is still dependent on the other quantum. Yet it is 
not completely dependent on the latter and is not a mere “quantum as such”, but it is a 
quantum “specified in a constant [konstante] manner” (SL 337 / LS 376). This moment of 
constant ‘specification’, Hegel notes, constitutes the “exponent” that governs the relation 
between the something and any quantum that changes it. If the same amount is added to 
different things, their specific measures or exponents will thus ensure that each in fact 
increases by a different amount.  
This kind of measure, Hegel claims, explains why different bodies absorb in different 
ways the heat transferred to them. As the temperature of a “general medium” — say, the air 
— increases, particular bodies in the medium differ in the way they absorb it, “for through 
their immanent measure they determine the externally received temperature” (SL 338 / LS 
377-378, translation altered). This “immanent measure” is their “specific heat” (spezifische 
Wärme), and it explains why, for example, a metal absorbs heat at a different rate from water. 
The third form of measure is thus not just a form of thought, but it underlies a significant 
phenomenon in nature.  
 
IV. Measure as the Quantitative Relation between Qualities 
 
11 
 
After examining this “specifying measure”, Hegel proceeds to render explicit what is implicit 
in the latter, and he thereby again derives a new form of measure. He points out first that the 
merely external quantum we have been considering is not in fact purely quantitative after all, 
because it is itself “qualitatively different” from quality, that is, from the qualitative, 
specifying measure (SL 339 / LS 378, translation altered). This in turn reflects the fact that 
quantity as such is qualitatively different from quality: it is a further form of quality that no 
longer exhibits the characteristic logical structure of quality itself.28 For this very reason, 
however, the external quantum in the specifying measure is explicitly quantitative, not 
qualitative; this is why it is subject to specification by the measure and not the other way 
around. The quantum, as quantum, is thus only implicitly qualitative, and there is only an 
implicit qualitative difference between it and its specifying counterpart. When, however, that 
implicit qualitative difference is rendered explicit, or “posited in the immediacy of being” (SL 
339 / LS 378-379), in accordance with speculative method,29 both sides in the relation have to 
be conceived as explicitly qualitative. That means in turn that the quantum on each side is not 
merely a quantum but the specific quantum of a quality.  
 This takes us to a new logical structure that must be carefully distinguished from its 
predecessors. Both the rule and the specifying measure confront a quantum that is, or belongs 
to, something other than the measure.30 Such a something in turn necessarily has a certain 
quality; indeed, in the case of the specifying measure Hegel states that the quantum belongs 
to a something with “the same quality” as the measure itself (which enables the former to act 
on the latter and the latter to specify the effect the former has on it) (SL 337 / LS 376). Yet in 
these two cases, the quantum specified by the measure is a matter of indifference to the 
quality of the thing with that quantum; it is not explicitly the thing’s measure and so in that 
sense is not itself explicitly ‘qualitative’. The quantum belongs to something with a quality, 
and implicitly constitutes its measure since it permits the thing to be what it is; yet it is 
explicitly a mere “measureless” (maßlos) quantum — the mere quantum that the rule and the 
specifying measure require as their logical counterpart (SL 337 / LS 376).31  
                                                          
28 S. LS 1812 234, and SL 239, 323 / LS 258, 360: “The externality of the determinateness is the quality of 
quantum”.   
29 S. EL § 88 R. 
30 S. SL 337 / LS 375-376. 
31 Miller translates “maßlos” as “having no significance as a measure”. 
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 In the new logical structure, by contrast, that quantum is now itself explicitly 
qualitative. This means not just that it belongs to something with a quality, but that it is 
explicitly specific to such quality. The quantum that is merely external to the specifying 
measure is now no longer just a quantum but the “quantum of a something and of its quality” 
(SL 339 / LS 379, my emphasis). Both sides of the relation, therefore, now have the same 
logical structure: each is explicitly quantitative and qualitative.  
Note, however, that this shared structure does not eliminate the difference between the 
two sides. The reason why is that the external quantum becomes qualitative when we render 
explicit the implicit qualitative difference between it and its specifying counterpart. As Hegel 
puts it, it is “this difference between them” that is posited in the “immediacy of being” (SL 
339 / LS 378-379). So, although the external quantum does, indeed, become qualitative, like 
its counterpart, it does so as it becomes explicitly different qualitatively from the latter. The 
two sides in the new logical structure must, therefore, have their own distinctive qualities, 
and the quantum that each is must be the specific quantum of that quality. It is, of course, 
possible, as a matter of fact, to encounter two related things with the same specific quantum 
and same quality, such as two equal amounts of water; but such a relation between things is 
not what is made necessary at this point by the logic of measure. What is made necessary 
here is a relation between two things, each of which has its specific quantum and the 
distinctive quality associated with the latter. In the new measure, therefore, two quanta now 
coincide with two different qualities in relation to one another.32  
There is, however, a subtle logical difference between the things as qualitative and as 
quantitative. As qualitative, they are principally distinct from one another; indeed, Hegel 
states, “each is for itself [für sich] such a determinate being” (SL 339 / LS 379, translation 
altered).33 As such, therefore, they are not explicitly related to one another: they are not 
connected by their different qualities. In the previous “specifying” measure, however, 
measure took the form of the explicit relation between two quanta (in which one altered or 
“specified” the other). This remains the case in the new measure, since the latter simply 
renders explicit what is implicit in its predecessor. Accordingly, although the two things in 
this measure are, as qualitative, not explicitly related, they are explicitly related to one 
                                                          
32 This is not to deny that the two quanta may be the same, but in each case it is the specific quantum of its 
quality. 
33 S. also SL 344 / LS 384. 
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another by their specific magnitudes. As Hegel puts it, “measure is thus the immanent 
quantitative relating of two qualities to each other” (SL 340 / LS 379). 
This measure is, more precisely, a single measure — “ein Maß” (SL 336 / LS 375) — 
that consists in a quantitative relation between qualities. Moreover, since each side of this 
relation is the “specific magnitude” of a quality, each is itself a measure in its own right (SL 
339 / LS 379). The new measure we are considering is thus one measure that is a relation 
between two measures.34 
Now, as we know, a measure as such contains a quantum in two senses: once as 
constituting the measure itself — as the quantum that is specific to, and sustains, the quality 
of the thing concerned — and once as an immediate, ‘external’ quantum that can change (and 
exceed the measure of the thing). Accordingly, the two quanta in the new measure must also 
be both kinds of quantum. In Hegel’s words, “the quantum in its dual character [Doppelsein] 
is both external and specific so that each of the distinct quantities possesses this twofold 
determination and is at the same time inseparably linked with the other” (SL 340 / LS 379). 
Each, therefore, must be a merely external, changeable quantum in relation to another such 
quantum, but each must also be a specific quantum that belongs specifically to this quality 
rather than that. Hegel argues that this requires the new measure to take three different forms, 
depending on which aspect of the measure is more to the fore. Two of these will mirror 
measures we have already encountered, whereas the third will be unique to this new measure 
and, indeed, will alone be the full realisation of the latter. 
 As just noted, each quality in the new measure has a quantum that belongs 
specifically to it (and so each has its own measure). Initially, however, this must itself be 
merely some simple, immediate quantum that is attached to the quality: as Hegel puts it, the 
two sides in the relation are “taken at first simply as determinacies of magnitude 
[Größebestimmtheiten]” (SL 341 / LS 380, translation altered). The new measure thus 
consists first in the relation between these magnitudes. It is a definite, fixed relation between 
them, because it has a determinate character of its own that makes it the measure it is; yet the 
two quanta in the relation, as simple, immediate quanta, are also inherently changeable. The 
distinctive “determinacy of the measure” (Maßbestimmung) thus resides in a fixed relation, or 
direct ratio, between two changeable quanta: so, as one increases, the measure requires the 
other to increase by a proportional amount.35 As an example of this measure, Hegel points to 
                                                          
34 S. SL 330, 339 / LS 368, 378. 
35 For the term “Maßbestimmung”, s. SL 340 / LS 379. Miller translates it as “determination of measure”.  
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velocity, in which a certain quantum of space is traversed in a given time: say, two metres per 
second. The distance travelled can increase from two to four metres, but the measure is 
preserved insofar as the direct ratio between distance and time — the velocity — is 
preserved: so four metres are traversed in two seconds.36 Velocity might seem to be a purely 
arbitrary relation between distance and time, but it in fact combines the two aspects of 
measure noted above. The magnitudes of the distance and time are, indeed, simply given, and 
so arbitrary, and the velocity could just as easily have been another. Yet the velocity is the 
measure of a certain (uniform rectilinear) motion,37 and each magnitude, as a moment of that 
measure, is specific to its quality and stands in a fixed relation to its counterpart (even as it 
changes).  
 The two sides of the new measure must, however, be more clearly differentiated from 
one another than this, since their relation must also render explicit the difference within 
measure between the measure itself and the mere quantum. This difference is present in 
velocity, since, as in the rule, one of the qualities provides the “unit” through which the 
other’s amount is “specifically determined” (SL 341 / LS 380): velocity is distance-per-unit-
of-time or time-per-unit-of-distance. Just as in the rule, however, the unit can itself be 
regarded as an amount, so each side remains a given quantum. To understand how measure 
and quantum can be explicitly distinguished in the new measure, therefore, we must look 
back to the measure that comes after the rule. In the latter, one moment remains a mere 
quantum, but the other is the “specifying” measure that explicitly negates and changes the 
first (rather than just subordinating it to a rule). It does so by asserting its distinctive quality 
— or, in Hegel’s words, “the qualitative moment” — against its counterpart (SL 338 / LS 
377). 
Now, as we know, every measure is a quantum that is specific to, and so one with, a 
quality. The identity of quantum and quality can, however, be more or less explicit. In the 
first, immediate measure (described in 1.A of the section on measure in the Logic), the 
quantum to which a quality is attached is itself simply immediate: it is just “some determinate 
quantum”, or range of quanta, that sustains “some determinate quality” (SL 333 / LS 371, 
translation altered). Yet at the end of the account of quantity, just before the transition to 
                                                          
36 S. SL 342 / LS 381-2. Note that space (or distance) and time are regarded here as qualities whose quanta stand 
in a certain relation; s. SL 341 / LS 380. In the philosophy of nature, however, the ‘quality’ of space is itself 
understood to be “pure quantity”; s. EPN § 254 R.   
37 S. Biard et al 1981, p. 247.  
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measure, the quantum proves to be explicitly qualitative by raising itself to a power of itself: 
for, in doing the latter, it relates to itself in becoming another quantum and thereby exhibits 
the distinctive quality of “self-relation” that characterizes “being-for-self”.38 It follows that a 
quantum is most explicitly one with quality as a measure, when it is not just “some 
determinate quantum” but one raised to a power. Logically, therefore, the specifying measure 
that explicitly differentiates itself from and acts on the mere quantum must change the latter 
“in accordance with a power-determination [Potenzenbestimmung]” (SL 338 / LS 377, 
translation altered) — though Hegel does not explain exactly how this might manifest itself in 
specific heat.39  
Since the two quanta in the new measure must also be distinguished from (and related 
to) one another as explicit measure and mere quantum, the former must also determine the 
latter by raising itself to a power of itself. This yields the second form of the new measure. 
Hegel’s example is Galileo’s law of falling bodies, according to which distance is 
proportional to the square of the time, or (as Hegel expresses it) s = at2 (SL 342 / LS 381). 
The distance and the time needed to traverse it are both changeable quanta, but, as in the case 
of simple velocity, their relation to one another is once again fixed. In this case, however, to 
calculate the distance travelled in an increased time — say, in three seconds, rather than one 
— the initial distance-per-second is multiplied not just by the new time, but by the square of 
the new time. So, as Hegel explains in an addition to his Encyclopaedia Philosophy of 
Nature, if “the body falls a little more than 15 feet in the first second”, “in two seconds, the 
body falls, not twice but four times the distance, i.e. 60 feet; in three seconds it falls 9 x 15 
feet, and so on” (EPN § 267 A).40 This relation between distance and the square of the time 
does not characterise all movement, but it is the distinctive measure of freely falling, and 
thereby uniformly accelerating, bodies (on a planet or moon); and Hegel claims that it is 
logically necessary that there be a measure with this form.41 
                                                          
38 S. SL 321-323 / LS 359-361, and Houlgate 2014, p. 27-28. 
39 In fact specific heat or ‘heat capacity’ itself decreases at low temperatures ‘in accordance with a power- 
determination’; s. Vallance Group: “the Debye heat capacity decreases as T3 at low temperatures, in agreement 
with experimental observation”. 
40 S. Houlgate 2005, p. 138-144. 
41 Another possible example of this form of measure is “e = mc2”, though of course we cannot know what Hegel 
himself would have thought about the latter.  
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 The new measure that has arisen at this point in the Logic thus takes the form of two 
distinct relations between quanta. Yet Hegel argues that it also takes the form of a third 
relation, in which, indeed, this new measure is most fully realised. This third relation renders 
explicit the fact that the measure is a relation between two measures. The two sides are thus 
not just quanta, and are not just related as quantum and its specifying counterpart, but both 
are quanta raised to a power — though each is raised to a different power, and so “specified” 
in a different way, by the different quality to which it belongs.42 The example Hegel gives of 
this third form of the new measure is Kepler’s third law of planetary motion: the principle 
that the squares of the orbital periods of any two planets are proportional to the cubes of their 
mean distances from the sun, or (in Hegel’s expression) s3 = at2 (SL 342 / LS 381).43 Once 
again, not all motion is subject to this law, but the law is a specific measure of planetary 
motion, and it exemplifies a form of measure that, in Hegel’s view, is made necessary 
logically by the nature of measure itself.  
Hegel calls the measure we have been considering in this section “the realized 
measure” (SL 340 / LS 380). This measure realizes itself most fully, however, only in the 
third of the three forms that it takes: for only in this case are the two measures related to one 
another explicitly as quanta that are “qualitatively determined” and so as measures. The 
“higher realization of the qualifying of the quantitative”, Hegel states, “is that in which both 
sides are related to each other in higher determinations of powers (as is the case in s3 = at2)” 
(SL 342 / LS 381).44  
 
V. Contingency in Measure 
 
It can be tempting to admire the consistency of Hegel’s derivation of categories in the Logic, 
but to wonder what the point of it all is. In Hegel’s view, however, the point is one of great 
significance. Logic shows not just that certain categories are conceivable, but that they — and 
the corresponding ways of being — are logically necessary. It does so by demonstrating that 
                                                          
42 S. SL 341-342 / LS 381 (on the “extensive” and “intensive”). Note that, in Hegel’s view, the difference 
between the “extensive” and “intensive” also explains which quantum must be the power-determination in the 
second form of this measure.   
43 S. Houlgate 2005, p. 147-153. 
44 It is clear from Hegel’s account of the realized measure that his interest in Galileo and Kepler arises not just 
from their importance for science but from the fact that their laws express necessary measures; s. SL 343 / LS 
383. On the relative significance of Kepler and Newton, in Hegel’s view, s. Houlgate 2005, p. 155-156. 
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they are inherent in thought — and being — itself; and it does this by rendering explicit what 
is implicit in the category of pure being and the subsequent categories that arise. The logic of 
measure thus shows that certain forms of measure belong of necessity to the very fabric of 
being. The occurrence of these forms of measure in nature is then confirmed by the examples 
that Hegel provides.45  
 Hegel’s logic of measure is thus not just a “reconstruction” of concepts from the 
history of philosophy or science; nor is it just a critique of inadequate ways of thinking 
“determinately” about reality.46 It is a positive metaphysics that discloses the measures there 
must be in the world. This in turn means that, for speculative philosophy, certain forms of 
motion and the laws that govern them are not just contingent, but exemplify being’s very own 
measures. This, however, is not to deny that there is contingency in the world. Indeed, Hegel 
argues that such contingency is actually an integral feature of measure itself.  
It has been noted above that in a measure the quantum has a “dual character” (SL 340 
/ LS 379): it is, on the one hand, a mere quantum and, on the other, a quantum that is specific 
to a certain quality (and thus the measure of the thing concerned). This dual character is 
evident in the fact that the very first measure (in 1.A) is a quantum that sets a limit to the 
changes it can undergo as a mere quantum; and it becomes explicit in the relation between, 
first, the rule and the quantum and, second, the specifying measure and the quantum. As we 
have just seen, this dual character also manifests itself in the new “realized” measure by 
requiring the latter to take three forms: the relation between two quanta, the relation between 
a quantum and a “specifying” quantum in the form of a power-determination, and the relation 
between two power-determinations. The dual character, however, also manifests itself in the 
fact that the last two relations themselves coincide with relations between simple, given 
quanta; and it is this fact that places contingency at the heart of measure. 
A simple quantum is by its nature contingent, since it is simply and immediately what 
it is and could just as well be different; there is thus contingency in the fact that there is this 
much water, rather than that much, in the sea. There is also contingency in the fact that 
something has its measure in this immediate quantum — that water boils at 100o C, rather 
than 60o C — and the fact that the first form of realized measure, velocity, has this 
                                                          
45 In speculative logic these are just examples, but in the philosophy of nature Hegel argues that they are 
themselves made necessary by the logic of nature (that is, of space and time); s. SL 342 / LS 382; EPN § 267 R, 
§ 270 R, and Houlgate 2005, p. 138-153. 
46 For Karin de Boer, by contrast, Hegel’s logic as a whole is such a reconstruction, and for Robert Pippin the 
doctrine of being as a whole is such a critique. S. de Boer 2010, p. 40-41, and Pippin 1989, p. 191-201.  
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magnitude. These measures, as measures, are logically necessary; but they necessarily 
contain contingency, because the quanta they involve must be immediately given and thus be 
beyond explanation by logic. This is not, of course, to deny that natural science might be able 
to explain why water boils at 100o C or an object travels at a certain speed, but logic alone 
cannot do so.47 
Now logic, as we have seen, requires the realized measure to take two further forms 
beyond that exemplified by velocity. In these forms, however, the quanta concerned are not 
just immediate, and so contingent, but one has, or both have, a character that is made 
necessary by logic itself (more specifically by the logic of quantity). In the ‘Galilean’ realized 
measure one quantum is thus a power-determination, and in the ‘Keplerian’ measure both 
quanta are. The ‘Keplerian’ measure in particular is, therefore, explicitly the relation between 
two specifying quanta, or measures, rather than between two merely immediate and 
contingent quanta.  
Yet a measure as such is both a measure and an immediate quantum at the same time. 
This should thus be the case in both the last two forms of realized measure; and indeed closer 
attention shows that it is. One might think that such immediacy can be found in the particular 
powers to which quanta are raised in those measures, but Hegel argues in the philosophy of 
nature that these powers are themselves necessary, so I will leave them to one side here.48 
There is, however, an element of immediacy and contingency in those measures in another 
sense: for each power is itself the power of an immediate quantum. These immediate quanta 
are represented in the two laws that exemplify the two measures by s and t, that is, distance 
and time; any power of s and t must, therefore, also be an immediate quantum, and, 
accordingly, the measure itself — s = at2 or s3 = at2 — must be a direct ratio between such 
quanta. This ratio in turn must have an exponent that is found by dividing one side of the 
ratio by the other, and this exponent is the ineliminable element of contingent immediacy in 
the realized measure. It is what Hegel calls the “empirical coefficient” in such a measure and 
it is represented in his expressions of the two laws of motion by a (SL 346 / LS 386).49 
Note, however, that this “coefficient” is not only a function of s and t, but also the 
immediate quantitative determinacy of the measure: it is the quantum that gives the measure 
its distinctive empirical character. As such, it is the moment of fixed immediacy or “being-
                                                          
47 On the limits of philosophy with respect to nature, s. EPN § 250 R, 268 A, and Houlgate 2005, p. 112-115. 
48 S. EPN § 267 R, 270 R, and Houlgate 2005, p. 141-142, 150-153. 
49 S. Doz 1970, p. 141, and Ferrini 1998, p. 300-301. 
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for-self” in the measure that limits the change of s and t (SL 346 / LS 386) — though, of 
course, it can itself change and so give rise to a different empirical measure. The change of s 
and t is thus limited in two ways by the two aspects of the measure. On the one hand, it is 
limited by the logical form of the measure: so in the ‘Galilean’ measure, the distance 
travelled by a falling body must be proportional to the square of the time that has passed, or s 
= t2. On the other hand, it is also limited by the “empirical coefficient” in the measure: so s = 
a x t2 (where a is the distance the body falls in the first unit of time). 
  Freely falling bodies thus always fall in accordance with Galileo’s law, but their rate 
of fall is also governed by a particular number that is not determined by the logic of measure 
(or by the nature of space and time) and so, from the point of view of speculative philosophy, 
is immediate and contingent. In the philosophy of nature Hegel reminds us that, leaving aside 
the effects of air resistance, bodies on the same planet fall at the same rate.50 Their rate of fall 
may differ, however, from planet to planet and moon to moon: the same body in the same 
initial unit of time may fall a different distance on a different planet. The ground of the 
distinctive immediacy that determines the way bodies fall is thus to be found in the terrestrial 
(or lunar) body to which they belong.51 
 A similar empirical coefficient governs the movement of the planets in our solar 
system. Each planet lies at a different mean distance from the sun and has a different orbital 
period; but in each case the cube of the distance is proportional to the square of the period, 
and in each case the exponent of the direct ratio between the two sides is the same, namely 
approximately twenty-five.52 Planets belonging to a different solar system will also obey 
Kepler’s third law (unless contingencies in the system intervene), and the ratio between the 
cubes of their mean distances from their sun to the squares of their orbital periods — when 
these are converted into simple numbers — will also be governed by an exponent; but the 
numerical value of that exponent may differ from that of our solar system. 
 
VI. Transition to Real Measure 
                                                          
50 S. EPN § 267 A, and Houlgate 2005, p. 142. 
51 The surface gravity on the Moon, for example, is 0.16 of that on Earth, and on Mars it is 0.38. S. Sparrow 
2006, p. 72, 88.   
52 The mean distance of Mars from the sun is 227.9 million kilometres and its orbital period is 687 earth days. If 
one divides the cube of the former by the square of the latter, the result is 25.079. The mean distance of Jupiter 
from the sun is 778.3 million kilometres and its orbital period is 11.86 earth years. In this case, the cube of the 
former divided by the square of the latter yields the result, 25.158. S. Sparrow 2006, p. 88, 140. 
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The measure that governs the fall of a body or the orbit of a planet is thus not just one single 
measure but comprises two relations: a ‘specifying’ relation between powers (or a power and 
a quantum) and a direct relation between amounts. These two relations are, however, 
independent of one another: the fact that a body is subject to Galileo’s law does not determine 
how far it should fall in the first period of time, and the fact that s3 = at2 does not require a to 
have one value rather than another. In that sense, the two relations constitute two distinct 
measures governing falling or orbiting bodies. Yet these two distinct measures actually 
constitute one measure, since any ‘specifying’ relation between quanta of qualities is 
inseparable from a direct relation between quanta and the latter will always have a given 
exponent: that is to say, whenever s = at2 or s3 = at2, a must have some particular numerical 
value.  
 The realized measure is thus not simply a relation between two quanta (one or both of 
which is a power-determination), but it is also the relation between, and indeed unity of, two 
different relations between those quanta (SL 347 / LS 387-388). Implicit in this measure so 
conceived, Hegel argues, is a new measure that he calls a “real measure”. When that new 
measure is considered in its initial immediacy, however, it must be a relation between two 
immediate, direct ratios, rather than between a direct ratio and a ratio involving powers (as in 
the realized measure). As Hegel puts it, “since the sides which now constitute the measure 
relation are themselves measures, but at the same time real somethings, their measures are, in 
the first place, immediate measures and the relations in them are direct relations” (SL 348 / 
LS 388-389, translation altered). The real measure, therefore, is a ratio in which the two sides 
are no longer just quanta — whether simple or raised to a power — but ratios. Since, 
however, the latter are direct ratios, their sides are once again — like the sides of the simplest 
realized measure — quanta of given qualities. Density, which Hegel cites as an example of 
such a direct ratio, is thus the ratio between a quantum of mass and a quantum of volume.53 
The real measure is therefore exemplified in nature by the direct ratio between two 
densities, each of which is itself the direct ratio between a mass and a volume. The ratio 
                                                          
53 Ruschig points out that density can be expressed as g/cm3 and so still involves a power-determination 
(Ruschig 1997, p. 42). Yet density is nonetheless a direct ratio between mass and volume. If the density remains 
constant and the volume increases, the mass increases in proportion to the volume, not to the square or cube of 
the volume. By contrast, when the rate of fall of a body is constant, the distance travelled is proportional to the 
square of the time elapsed. Density thus exemplifies one ‘side’ of a real measure, whereas Galileo’s law of fall 
exemplifies the second form of realized measure. For an insightful account of real measure in the Logic, s. 
Schick 2014. 
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between the density of a substance and that of a reference substance (usually water or air) is 
called “specific gravity”. Specific gravity thus exemplifies the real measure, while simple 
density exemplifies the ratio that constitutes one side of such a measure. 
 
VII. Conclusion  
 
Readers will note that the various measures examined by Hegel are exemplified by very 
different natural phenomena: specific heat, the laws of gravitational motion, density (or 
specific gravity). Hegel, however, is not claiming that there is a necessary natural connection 
between these phenomena, or that one gives rise to the other in nature; that is something for 
natural science to consider. His claim is that implicit in the logical structure of each measure 
exemplified by such a phenomenon is the logical structure of a new measure, and that one 
measure thus makes another necessary logically. It is the intrinsic logic of measure, therefore, 
that generates the sequence of measures that Hegel discusses.  
 Measure is initially (in 1.A) the immediate unity of a quantum (or range of quanta) 
with a quality. This measure, however, also contains the difference between itself and the 
quantum of the thing by setting a limit to the latter beyond which the thing ceases to be. 
When this difference is rendered explicit, two new forms of measure are generated. In the 
first (in 1.B.a), the measure relates, as a mere quantum, to another quantum by providing the 
unit of which the other is the amount. In the second (in 1.B.b), the measure relates, as a 
specifying measure, to another quantum by limiting the changes that the latter can bring 
about in it. The mere quantum in this relation is, however, itself implicitly qualitative, since, 
as a quantum, it is qualitatively distinct from the explicitly qualitative measure. This points 
logically to a new, “realized” measure in which both sides have an explicit and distinct 
quality, but in which they are related by their quanta (see 1.B.c). Those quanta in turn are, in 
the first form of realized measure, mere quanta (for example, in simple velocity); but then, in 
the other two forms, at least one of them is an explicitly qualitative, “specified” quantum. As 
Hegel argues in the account of quantity, such a quantum is one that raises itself to a power of 
itself: for in so doing it exhibits the distinctive quality of “self-relation” that belongs to 
“being-for-self” (SL 321-323 / LS 359-361). The second and third forms of realized measure 
are thus relations, respectively, between a quantum and a power- determination and between 
two power-determinations. Each relation, however, coincides with a direct ratio between two 
mere quanta, and the realized measure thereby proves to be a relation between, or unity of, 
two different relations between the quanta concerned.   
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 This leads logically to the real measure, in which one measure is the relation between 
two relations, which in their initial immediacy are direct ratios, such as densities. The 
development of measure then leads to the explicit unity or “combination” of such ratios 
(because the real measure is two as one), and to a series of such combinations (since each 
ratio, as the relation between quanta, is subject to the logic of the quantum and the one [Eins], 
and so is not just one of two but one of many). The real measure thus proves to be an explicit 
unity, but is then dispersed into many different unities.54 
 The subsequent development of measure leads via further complex measures, such as 
“elective affinity” and the “nodal line”, to the transition from measure to essence.55 That 
development is too detailed to summarise here. What needs to be borne in mind throughout, 
however, is that it continues to be guided by the logic of measure, rather than the natural 
phenomena that, in Hegel’s view, exemplify each measure. It is certainly tempting to think 
that Hegel considers elective affinities, only because they were the subject of scientific 
concern at the time he was writing the Logic. In truth, however, he considers these affinities, 
and all the other measures, because the logic of measure itself requires him to.56 This logic is 
one to which Kant and Spinoza were both blind, but in Hegel’s view it is at work in both 
thought and being. It determines us to think about measures in certain ways (though such 
thought needs time and history to become fully explicit), and it also determines there to be 
certain measures in the world.57    
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